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According to Leyens et al.’s (2000) theory, intergroup discrimination involves a differential
appraisal of the ingroup’s and the outgroup’s uniquely human characteristics. Four experiments
investigated how emotions that are considered uniquely (i.e. secondary emotions) and non
uniquely (i.e. primary emotions) human (Demoulin et al., 2001a) are differentially associated
with the ingroup and the outgroup. Using the Implicit Association Task (IAT) we found a
stronger association of ingroup names with uniquely human emotions and of outgroup names
with non uniquely human emotions, than the reverse. Whereas Study 2 used negative emotions,
all other experiments used positive emotions. In Study 3, two IAT indices were collected: an
emotional index and a standard evaluative one. While the outgroup was constituted by North
African names in the first three studies, Study 4 staged French-speaking Belgians (i.e. the
ingroup) versus Dutch-speaking Belgians (i.e. the outgroup). The results are discussed within
the framework of psychological essentialism, according to which uniquely human characteristics
form the essence of the ingroup.
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HISTORICAL accounts of prejudice and discrimi-
nation (e.g. Taguieff, 1987; Todorov, 1989) tra-
ditionally date the ideological foundation of
modern forms of prejudice and discrimination
to the 19th century. Prejudice and discrimi-
nation arose to justify the discrepancy between
the claim of the universal principle in individual
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freedom, on the one hand, and its practical
exceptions such as slavery and colonialism, on
the other hand. Theories on human origins,
such as Darwin’s (1871), provided the ideo-
logical device to fill in this discrepancy. The idea
that the human species was part of the animal
kingdom made it easy to translate differences
between human groups into different levels of
similarity with animals. ‘Humans’, ‘infra-
humans’ and ‘bestial-men’ became powerful
metaphors to describe humankind and to legiti-
mate differential worth and treatment of human
beings (Burgio, 1998).
According to historical analyses, claiming the
human nature for one’s group and discrediting
other groups formed the basis for prejudice and
discrimination. In this article, we argue and
provide empirical evidence that this differential
appraisal of groups’ human nature is not limited
to ideology but that it also operates as a psycho-
logical device in intergroup discrimination. 
Are we all humans?
Groups exhibit various differences whether in
terms of habits, beliefs, or appearances. Accord-
ing to Rothbart and Taylor (1992), people
account for these differences by attributing
different essences to groups. Building upon
Medin’s (1989) analysis of categorization pro-
cesses, Rothbart and Taylor (1992) suggested
that people hold naive causal theories linking
superficial or surface properties (e.g. habits)
with deeper essentialist properties (e.g. genes)
(see also Haslam, Rothschild, & Ernst, 2000;
Hirschfeld, 1996; Medin, 1989).
Leyens et al. (2000) have proposed that one
result of this tendency to attribute essences to
social groups is a differential appraisal of these
groups’ human nature. They have argued that
the human nature is considered the underlying
essence of the ingroup. Consequently, when
people believe that differences between their
ingroup and outgroups are explainable by
different essences, perceived humanity of the
outgroups becomes questionable. They sug-
gested that believing in different essences (e.g.
cultural, biological, religious, etc.) for ingroups
and outgroups results in explicitly or implicitly
judging the ingroup to have some human
characteristics that the outgroup lacks. This
point raises the question of what can be con-
sidered human characteristics.
Relying on Schwartz’s (1992) value theory,
Struch and Schwartz (1989) proposed that the
perception of a group’s humanity can be con-
ceptualized in terms of possession of traits
assumed to distinguish humankind from lower
life forms. In their conceptualization, these
traits or values are considerateness and compas-
sion for all other beings, concern for the welfare
of all society’s members and raising children to
be humane. Leyens et al. (2000) approached the
same issue of perceived humanity from another
perspective. They asked Spanish and French-
speaking Belgian students to list what character-
izes human beings. A content analysis of the
responses of both samples resulted in an identi-
cal picture of humankind. More than half of the
participants in each sample gave the priority to
the same three general classes of characteristics:
characteristics that relate to human intelligence
(e.g. reasoning, thinking, rationality), charac-
teristics that relate to uniquely human emotions
(e.g. sentiments, love, regret), and character-
istics that relate to the human ability to com-
municate (e.g. language, writing). Plenty of
research has already shown that people discrim-
inate on the basis of intelligence (for a review,
see Crocker, Major, & Steele, 1998) and lan-
guage (Giles & Coupland, 1991). Conversely,
and as far as we know, the discriminatory role of
emotions has never been investigated. The
present paper aims to fill this gap.
When relating to human emotions, Belgian
and Spanish participants used the word senti-
ments (sentimientos) and gave examples of such
emotions. In Roman languages, the word senti-
ment refers to emotional experiences, but has a
special meaning that is not encompassed by the
word émotion.1 Such semantic distinction
between émotion and sentiment does not directly
exist in the English language. Demoulin et al.
(2001a) found that sentiments are perceived as
uniquely human while émotions are perceived as
common to humans and animals. Data also
showed that this lay distinction appears also in
cultures where no semantic label is available for
Group Processes & Intergroup Relations 5(2)
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it. For example, Americans and Dutch-speaking
Belgians could easily classify uniquely and non
uniquely human emotions (Demoulin et al.,
2001a). This lay distinction is somewhat similar
to the distinction made by researchers between
primary and secondary emotions (Demoulin et
al., 2001a). Thus, we will use the terms secondary
and primary emotions to refer to uniquely
human and non uniquely human emotions
respectively.
Differential association of primary
and secondary emotions with the
ingroup and the outgroup
In line with our reasoning, we suggest that
people associate secondary emotions with their
ingroup and primary emotions with outgroups.
We tested this hypothesis using the Implicit
Association Task (IAT) designed by Greenwald,
McGhee, and Schwartz (1998). In this task,
participants have to decide as rapidly as possible
between two categories. The stimulus words
consist of two kinds of terms: names of the
ingroup and of the outgroup, and positive and
negative words. In simple tasks, words varying
on only one dimension (e.g. ingroup vs. out-
group) are flashed on the computer and people
have to decide to which category each word
belongs. If they make a wrong decision, a feed-
back error is sent. In two other more complex
tasks, the two kinds of words are randomly pre-
sented in an alternate order and, again, the
decision is binary; one task is said to be com-
patible (ingroup-positive vs. outgroup-negative)
and the other incompatible (ingroup-negative
vs. outgroup-positive). The difference in
reaction times between the compatible and
incompatible tasks serves as an index of dis-
crimination (the IAT index). Introduced as a
method to investigate implicit social cognition
(Greenwald & Banaji, 1995), the IAT method
thus provides a measure of differential associ-
ation between two target concepts and an
attribute dimension.
Given the positive and negative terms in
Greenwald et al.’s method (1998), the differen-
tial association is evaluative. To detect a differ-
ential association between emotions and
groups, the IAT procedure requires that
ingroup vs. outgroup and primary vs. secondary
emotions discrimination tasks are performed in
two different combinations, according to the
category key response assignment. In one
combination, the ingroup category shares the
same response key with the secondary emotions
category and the outgroup category shares the
same response key with the primary emotions
category. In the other combination task, the key
assignment for ingroup–outgroup discrimi-
nation task is reversed. Now, the outgroup key
shares the same response with the secondary
emotions, and the ingroup with the primary
emotions category. The performances at these
two combined tasks are compared. If the
ingroup–outgroup differentiation involves a
differential appraisal of human emotions, this
should be observed in a stronger association of
ingroup with secondary emotions and of out-
group with primary emotions, than the reverse.
Moreover, these associations should hold true
for positive as well as negative emotions. Indeed,
secondary emotions are uniquely human
characteristics independent of their valence.
Four studies were conducted using the IAT
procedure (Greenwald et al., 1998). The
ingroup was either Spanish or Belgian depend-
ing on the sample. In the first three experiments,
the outgroup was represented by North Africans,
one of the major, and most controversial, recent
groups of immigrants in Europe. In Study 4,
Flemish (i.e. Dutch-speaking) Belgians consti-
tuted the outgroup. The selection of emotion
words for the three studies was based on
Demoulin et al.’s (2001a) measurement of lay
conception of emotions. Prototypical positive
secondary and primary emotions were used in
Study 1. Study 2 included only negative primary
and secondary emotions, and Studies 3 and 4
controlled precisely the valence of the stimulus
words (see Table 1). Participants in Study 3 also
completed a second Implicit Associations Task,
which replicated the classic paradigm with
positive and negative stimulus words. This con-
junction allowed a comparison of the effect sizes
of the two materials and a look at the correlation
between the emotional and evaluative differen-
tial associations with ingroup and outgroup.
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Study 4 was conducted to allow some generaliza-
tion of the results by using a different outgroup.
Study 1
Belgian participants completed the five tasks of
the IAT (Greenwald et al., 1998). They classified
Belgian and North African names, as well as
primary and secondary emotions, in single-
classification tasks (i.e. North African vs. Belgian;
primary vs. secondary emotions) and in com-
bined-classification tasks. The combined tasks
were hypothesized to be either associatively com-
patible (i.e. North African/primary emotions
and Belgian/secondary emotions) or incom-
patible (i.e. North African/secondary emotions
and Belgian/primary emotions). Since we
wanted participants to deal with only one dimen-
sion at a time, we opted for male names and
positive emotions only. We expected that partici-
pants would show a stronger association of
secondary emotions with the ingroup and of
primary emotions with the outgroup than vice
versa. Stated otherwise, faster reaction times
were predicted for North African/primary
emotions and Belgian/secondary emotions than
for Belgian/primary emotions and North
African/secondary emotions.
Group Processes & Intergroup Relations 5(2)
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Table 1. List of primary-non uniquely and secondary-uniquely human emotions stimuli used in the four
studies 
Valence Emotion Study
Primary/non uniquely human
Negative Cruelty (ferocidad ) 2
Fear (miedo) 2
Pain (dolor) 2
Terror (terror) 2
Rage (rabia) 2
Positive Desire (désir) 1 & 3
Lust/enjoyment (jouissance) 1 & 3
Attraction (attraction) 1, 3 & 4
Surprise (surprise) 1, 3 & 4
Pleasure (plaisir) 1, 3 & 4
Joy (joie) 4
Excitement (excitation) 4
Secondary/ uniquely human
Negative Despair (despecho) 2
Disappointment (decepción) 2
Guilt (culpa) 2
Remorse (remordimiento) 2
Shame (vergüenza) 2
Positive Amazement (émerveillement) 1
Admiration (admiration) 3
Compassion (compassion) 3
Happiness (bonheur) 4
Empathy (empathie) 4
Fondness (tendresse) 1 & 3
Serenity (sérénité) 1 & 3
Friendliness (amitié) 1 & 4
Hope (espérance) 3 & 4
Love (amour) 1, 3 & 4
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Method
Participants Thirty-four students of the Uni-
versity of Louvain-la-Neuve participated in the
experiment for course credits. Two participants
did not complete part of the questionnaire
measure and their data were excluded from the
analysis.
Materials Twenty stimuli words were used for
the IAT: 5 typically North African names, 5 typi-
cally Belgian names, 5 secondary emotions, and
5 primary emotions (see Table 1). The primary
and secondary emotions were selected on the
basis of a previous study (Demoulin et al.,
2001a) as prototypical positive exemplars of
each category. Although all the stimulus words
were clearly positive, pre-test data indicated that
secondary emotions (M = 6.4) were judged
more positively on a 7-point scale (1 = not at all
positive; 7 = very positive) than primary ones (M
= 5.8) (t(39) = 5.95, p < .001).
Stimuli were presented via a desktop com-
puter and responses were provided via the key-
board. The participants used the A key for left
responses and the 5 key on the right side of the
numeric keypad for right responses.
Procedure The experiment was introduced as
an application of reaction time measures to
social psychological research. Participants were
run individually. All the instructions were pro-
vided by the computer.
IAT measure The IAT measure followed Green-
wald et al.’s (1998) procedure. All participants
completed the five steps of the IAT method.
They started with two single classification tasks
(step 1: Belgian vs. North African names and step
2: secondary vs. primary emotions) and went
through one of the two combined-classification
tasks (step 3). A name-classification task followed
(step 4). In this task, the category response-key
assignment was reversed in order to prepare the
participants to the last combined task (step 5).
The presentation order of the associatively com-
patible and the associatively incompatible com-
bined tasks was counterbalanced, so that the
compatible combined task was administered
either as the third or fifth task. In the compatible
combined task, ingroup and secondary emo-
tions responses were made using the right key,
and outgroup and primary emotions using the
left key. In the incompatible one, responses for
ingroup and outgroup were reversed and differ-
ently combined with the primary and secondary
emotions. All tasks were introduced by instruc-
tions that described the categories to be distin-
guished and the assignment of response keys to
categories. For the emotion tasks, the category
labels were the French words émotion or sentiment.
After the instructions for each task, a practice
block was performed, followed by one block of
single-classification tasks and two blocks of com-
bined-classification tasks. Each block consisted
of 50 trials. During the practice blocks, the
category labels remained on the screen posi-
tioned to the left or to the right according to key
assignments.
The stimuli were presented vertically and hori-
zontally centered on the display and remained
on the screen until a response was provided or
until 3000 ms had elapsed. The intertrial interval
was 400 ms, except for the second block of com-
bined tasks where it was 200 ms. The only aim of
this change was to verify whether one type of
intertrial interval would give better results than
the other (see also Greenwald et al., 1998). In the
case of an incorrect response, the word ‘Error’
replaced the stimulus during 300 ms.
For the single-classification tasks, the stimuli
were selected randomly and without replace-
ment. Each stimulus appeared five times in each
block. In order to counterbalance the order of
presentation, five different lists of stimuli were
created. Each list was conceived so that names
and emotions appeared on alternating trials and
without replacement until the available stimuli
were exhausted. Thereupon the stimulus pool
was replaced for new trials. For the two blocks of
combined tasks, each stimulus appeared five
times. We paid special attention to not repeating
stimuli sequences in the same list.
Results and discussion
Only the combined tasks (7.03% errors) were
analyzed. Latencies for errors and for the first
three trials in each block were excluded from
the statistical analysis. A 2 (order of combined
Paladino et al. emotions and intergroup relations
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tasks: compatible–incompatible vs. incom-
patible–compatible)  5 (stimuli lists)  2
(combined tasks: compatible vs. incompatible)
 2 (intertrial interval: 400 ms vs. 200 ms)
mixed analysis of variance (ANOVA) with the
last two factors as within-participant variables
was conducted on the mean log-transformed
and raw latencies for the combined tasks
responses. Given that in this experiment and in
all the other ones, both analyses provided the
same results, only the results for the log-trans-
formed latencies will be reported. The order 
intertrial interval interaction reached signifi-
cance (F (1, 22) = 9.35, p < .006), but this effect
was qualified by the three way list  order 
intertrial interval interaction2 (F (4, 22) = 3.78,
p < .02).
Most importantly, and as expected, the main
effect for combined tasks was significant (F (1,
22) = 12.80, p < .002). Participants reacted faster
to North African/primary emotions and
Belgian/secondary emotions (M = 826 ms)
stimuli than to Belgian/primary emotions and
North African/secondary emotions (M = 883
ms) stimuli. This main effect was not qualified
by any of the procedural variables. Collapsing all
factors other than compatibility of the task, the
effect size is d = .66.
Study 1 was designed to serve as a preliminary
test of the hypothesis that primary and second-
ary emotions constitute a dimension for inter-
group differentiation. The results show that the
ingroup and the outgroup were differentially
associated with primary and secondary emo-
tions. Indeed, Belgian participants were faster in
responding to the outgroup/primary emotions
and ingroup/secondary emotions task than to
the ingroup/primary emotions and out-
group/secondary emotions task. Consistent
with the idea that secondary emotions are more
an ingroup than an outgroup feature, the differ-
ence between response times in these two tasks
indicates that the ingroup is more strongly
associated with secondary emotions and the out-
group with primary emotions than the reverse.
The selection of emotions for this experiment
was based on a preliminary study (Demoulin et
al., 2001a) that measured the perceptions of a
series of emotional terms on different dimen-
sions. The main criterion for selection of emo-
tions for Study 1 was their prototypicality for the
categories of secondary and primary emotions.
Because of that, secondary emotions were more
positive than primary ones, although all the
emotions used in this experiment were clearly
positive. This problem will be addressed in the
following studies.
Study 2
In Study 1, we showed that people implicitly
differentiate their ingroup from a disliked out-
group on the basis of primary and secondary
emotions. The purpose of Study 2 was to extend
these results to negative emotions. According to
our hypothesis, the ingroup and outgroup are
differently associated with primary and second-
ary emotions, because secondary emotions and
not primary emotions are considered uniquely
human, independently of their valence.
Indeed, when asked to list the uniquely human
characteristics, participants responded senti-
ments and not positive or negative sentiments. If
our hypothesis is correct, the negativity of the
emotional experience should not make any
difference and the results of Study 1 should be
replicated.
Method
Participants Twenty-two students of the Uni-
versity of La Laguna in Tenerife participated in
the experiment on a voluntary basis.
Materials As in Study 1, 20 stimulus words
were used: five Spanish male names; five Arabic
male names; five undesirable primary emotions
and five undesirable secondary emotions (see
Table 1). As in the first experiment, the selec-
tion of emotions was based on their prototypi-
cality for their categories as it was measured in a
previous study (Demoulin et al., 2001a).
However, this time, the valence of the two
categories was almost equal. On a 7-point scale
(1 = not at all desirable; 7 = totally desirable),
pre-test data indicated that secondary emotions
(M = 1.65) were judged somewhat less desirable
than primary emotions (M = 1.87) (t(36) =
–1.94, p < .06). 
Group Processes & Intergroup Relations 5(2)
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IAT measure The study was identical to the
previous one, except for the order of the com-
bined tasks and the stimuli presentation. All
participants completed first the ingroup +
primary emotions and outgroup + secondary
emotions task, followed by the outgroup +
primary emotions and ingroup + secondary
emotions task. This procedural simplification
should not affect the results because, as was
shown in Study 1, the order of combined tasks
had no influence on the IAT index.
Results and discussion
As in Study 1, reaction times for errors (3.85%)
and the first three trials of each block were not
considered in the statistical analysis. As
expected, Spanish participants were faster in
responding to Spanish/ secondary emotions
and North African/primary emotions stimuli
(M = 759 ms) than to North African/ secondary
emotions and Spanish/primary emotions
stimuli (M = 800 ms) (F(1, 21) = 9,56, p < .006).
Consistent with the idea that uniquely human
emotions are considered more an ingroup than
an outgroup feature, the IAT index (IAT = 41
ms) and the effect size (d = .67) reveal again that
the ingroup is more strongly associated with
secondary-uniquely human emotions and the
outgroup with primary-non uniquely human
emotions than the reverse, even when the
emotional experience is unpleasant. It is worth
noting that, differently from Study 1, the
valence of the primary and secondary emotions
was not different in this study; in fact, the
primary emotions were perceived as somewhat
more desirable than the secondary ones.
Study 3
Study 3 had two aims. First, we wanted to control
for the role of valence in the differential associ-
ation of pleasant primary and secondary emo-
tions. As we did in the previous study, we
selected for the third experiment stimuli that
were equivalent in their valence according to a
pre-test. In addition, we measured the desirabil-
ity of the emotion stimuli by asking the partici-
pants themselves to fill out a short questionnaire
before performing the computer tasks.
As a second aim, we wanted to compare our
emotional IAT with the (classic) evaluative IAT
(Greenwald et al., 1998) involving positively and
negatively valenced words. Belgian participants
completed first the five IAT steps involving
Belgian and North African names, and primary
and secondary emotions of equal valence. In a
second stage, emotions were replaced by
positive and negative words, and a new set of
single and combined classification tasks was
accomplished by the same participants.
Method
Participants Twenty-two students of the Uni-
versity of Louvain-la-Neuve took part in the
experiment and received a lottery ticket for
their participation. Data from one participant
were excluded from the IAT analyses because of
random responding (an error rate of 50%) in
the last combined task.
Materials In order to balance the valence of
the primary and secondary emotions, we
created two different lists. The valence of the
selected primary and secondary emotions was
measured in a pre-test study and during the
experiment on a 7-point scale (1 = not at all
positive; 7 = very positive). Both sets of results
indicated that the valence of primary and
secondary emotions within each list did not
differ. In each case, the evaluations of primary
and secondary emotions were analyzed by a 2
(stimuli list: 1 vs. 2)  2 (stimuli: primary emo-
tions vs. secondary emotions) ANOVA with the
last factor as a within-participant variable. For
the pre-test data, only a main effect of list was
significant (F (1, 23) = 13.65, p < .05). Emotions
of list 1 (M = 5.98) were rated more positively
than emotions of list 2 (M = 5.61). No other
effect was significant. A similar picture emerged
from the participants’ evaluation. The main
effect of list was marginally significant (F (1, 19)
= 3.77, p = .07). Again, the emotions of list 1 (M
= 6.17) were judged more positive than those of
list 2 (M = 5.71). No other effect was significant.
For the second, evaluative IAT measure, three
positive and three negative stimuli were used.
Pre-test data indicated that the negative stimuli
were evaluated much more negatively (M =
Paladino et al. emotions and intergroup relations
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2.00) than the positive stimuli (M = 6.08) on a 7-
point scale.
Procedure
IAT measures The first five computer tasks
were identical to those of Study 1, except for the
order of the initial discrimination tasks. In
Study 3, participants first classified emotions
(primary emotions vs. secondary emotions)
and then names (North African vs. Belgian).
Four more steps were added to the first five in
order to measure the implicit evaluative
attitude toward Belgians and North Africans.
First, participants went through positive and
negative words in a single-classification task
(step 6), and then they classified these words in
combination with Belgian and North African
names (step 7). The response keys for Belgian
and North African names were reversed in the
following single-classification task (step 8) to
prepare the participants for the last combined
task (step 9). Compatible and incompatible
combined tasks were counterbalanced. All the
participants completed first the emotional IAT
and then the evaluative IAT. To shorten as
much as possible the computer session, the
order of compatible and incompatible tasks
involving positive–negative words was always
contrary to the order of combined tasks involv-
ing emotions.
The stimuli were presented in blocks of 30
trials for single discrimination tasks and of 50
trials for combined tasks. All tasks consisted of
one practice block followed by one data collec-
tion block. For the practice block, the stimuli
remained on the display until a correct response
was given. In case of incorrect responses, the
word ‘Error’ appeared until a correct response
was provided. For the data collection blocks, the
stimuli presentation was identical to Study 1. All
blocks of trials were conducted with a 200 ms
intertrial interval.
Results and discussion
As in previous studies, reaction times for the
errors (5.85% and 4.30% for the emotional and
evaluative IATs, respectively) and the first three
trials of each block were not considered in the
statistical analyses.
The IAT indices For the sake of clarity, the
performance for emotions and positive–
negative words were analyzed separately. In both
cases, a 2 (list: 1 vs. 2)  2 (order of com-
bined tasks: compatible–incompatible vs.
incompatible–compatible)  2 (combined task:
compatible vs. incompatible) mixed ANOVA
with the last factor as within-participant variable
was conducted.
Emotional IAT index As expected, participants
were faster in responding to the outgroup/
primary emotions and ingroup/secondary emo-
tions task (M = 802 ms) than to the ingroup/
primary emotions and outgroup/secondary
emotions one (M = 875 ms) (F (1, 17) = 12.35,
p < .01). Collapsing all factors other than com-
patibility of the task, the effect size is d = .85.
Thus, even when we control for the desirability
of primary and secondary emotions, the magni-
tude of the difference (IAT = 73 ms) and the
effect size for the emotional IAT index remain
very similar to the previous ones. Actually, the
effect size (d = .85) is even higher than in Study
1 (d = .66) where the emotions were unequally
positive, and than in Study 2 (d = .67) where the
emotions had an equal negative valence.
Evaluative IAT index Here again, the main
effect for combined task was significant (F (1,
17) = 22.62, p < .0002). A better performance
was observed for outgroup/negative words and
ingroup/positive words (M = 711 ms) than for
ingroup/negative words and outgroup/positive
words (M = 784 ms), revealing an implicit preju-
dice toward North Africans. The magnitude of
the IAT index (IAT = 73 ms) was identical to that
obtained in tasks involving emotions, and the
effect size (d = 1.11), although larger, was not
significantly so (z = .46, p = .32).
Correlation between emotional and evaluative IAT
index Even when excluding the data of a clear
outlier, the correlation between the two IAT
indices was not significant (r(20) = .37, p = .10).
This level of correlation between the emotional
and the evaluative IAT index is somehow com-
parable to those observed in other studies
investigating the relations between associative
Group Processes & Intergroup Relations 5(2)
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and other implicit group-related measures
(Dovidio, Kawakami, Johnson, Johnson, &
Howard, 1997, Experiments 2 and 3).
Study 4
The main aim of this fourth experiment is to
generalize the different findings to a different
outgroup. Indeed, in all our previous studies
using the IAT, the outgroup was North African,
a very stigmatized minority and low-status group
in Belgium and in the Canary Islands as well. To
further ground our hypothesis, it was necessary
to show that the same results would be obtained
with a different outgroup. French-speaking
Belgian students being the participants of Study
4, Flemish people were selected as the outgroup.
There is a long history of political and insti-
tutional conflicts between Flemish and French-
speaking Belgians. However, it cannot be said
that the antagonism is important at the inter-
personal level and Flemish people certainly do
not suffer from a stigma. On the contrary,
Flemish people constitute the majority in
Belgium and they have more political and eco-
nomical power than French-speaking ones. One
may say that their status is higher than the one
of French-speaking Belgians.
Because generalization was the main purpose
of the study, we kept the paradigm to its
minimum. Because the order of compatible and
incompatible tasks did not produce different
results in previous experiments, we did not stage
the whole gamut of the possible procedural vari-
ables of the IAT, but opted for a single order of
tasks.
Method
Participants Fifteen French-speaking students
at the University of Louvain-la-Neuve took part
in the experiment on a voluntary basis. They
were fully debriefed after the study was over.
Procedure The procedure was identical to the
one of Study 2 with three exceptions. First, only
positive emotions were used, and the valence
between secondary (M = 6.25) and primary (M
= 6.02) emotions was not significantly different,
(t(22) = –1.715, ns). Second, Spanish first names
were replaced by typical French names (e.g.
Pierre, Luc), and North African names were
substituted by typical Flemish first names (e.g.
Jeroen, Jos). Third, there was no intertrial inter-
val.3
Results and discussion
Only log-transformed latencies for combined
classification tasks are considered in the analysis
of data. Time reactions for errors (8%) were
excluded from the ANOVA.
As expected, French-speaking Belgians were
faster at responding to French/secondary emo-
tions vs. Flemish/primary emotions (M = 1086
ms) stimuli than to Flemish/secondary emo-
tions vs. French/primary emotions (M = 1248
ms) stimuli (F(1, 14) = 16.58, p < .005). Like in
the three previous studies, the IAT index (162
ms) and the effect size (d = 1.05) indicate that
the ingroup is more strongly associated with
secondary emotions and the outgroup with
primary emotions than the reverse. These
results are particularly interesting. Contrary to
North Africans, Flemish people are not a stig-
matized minority and their status is higher than
that of French-speaking persons. Thus, differ-
ential associations to secondary and primary
emotions are not restricted to a denigrated low-
status outgroup.
General discussion
Claiming the human nature for one’s group
while discrediting other groups provides an
ideological support for any form of discrimi-
nation and prejudice (e.g. Burgio, 1998; Guil-
laumin, 1972; Taguieff, 1987; Todorov, 1989).
Recently, Leyens et al. (2000) suggested that
such a process can be conceived of as a psycho-
logical device in intergroup differentiation.
Their rationale derives from an essentialist
perspective (e.g. Haslam et al., 2000; Hirschfeld,
1996; Medin, 1989; Rothbart & Taylor, 1992).
Leyens et al. (2000) proposed that the human
nature is believed to be the underlying essence
of the ingroup. Consequently, when the ingroup
and the outgroup are thought to have different
essences, the human nature of the outgroup
becomes questionable. This rationale should be
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empirically observed in a differential association
of uniquely human characteristics, such as intel-
ligence, language, and human emotions
(Demoulin et al., 2001a; Leyens et al., 2000) to
ingroup and outgroup.
Because the links between intelligence (e.g.
Crocker et al., 1998) and language (e.g. Giles &
Coupland, 1991), on the one hand, and preju-
dice, discrimination, or racism, on the other
hand, have already been largely investigated, we
focused on uniquely and non uniquely human
emotions in intergroup differentiation. In the
four studies presented in this article, we used
the IAT paradigm (Greenwald et al., 1998) and,
as expected, showed that people differentially
associate the ingroup and the outgroup with
primary and secondary emotions. The magni-
tude of the IAT indices and the different effect
sizes indicated that our participants associated
more strongly the ingroup with secondary emo-
tions and the outgroup with primary emotions,
than the reverse. Whether the emotions were
positive (Studies 1, 3, and 4) or negative (Study
2), whether the stimuli valence was slightly
different (Study 1) or equivalent (Studies 2, 3,
and 4), and whether the outgroup had a lower
(Studies 1, 2, and 3) or a higher (Study 4) status,
the same pattern of results emerged con-
sistently. Comparing the effect size estimations
by a meta-analytic procedure (Rosenthal &
Rosnow, 1991) shows a clear homogeneity
between studies (2(3) = 1.13, ns). These results
support our theoretical account.
The IAT paradigm does not allow singling out
which association or combination of associ-
ations is responsible for the difference between
compatible and incompatible tasks. Further
research with other paradigms is still needed.
However, given that the difference between
primary and secondary emotions is that only the
latter ones, and not the former ones, are con-
sidered a uniquely human expression, we can
conclude that human characteristics are, at least
tacitly, considered more an ingroup than an out-
group feature.
Along these lines, we collected in Study 3 data
for two different types of IAT: the emotional one
and the (standard) evaluative one. The results
showed that there was no difference of magni-
tude nor of effect size between these two indices.
Although the correlation between them
explained 14 percent of the variance, it did not
reach significance. Obviously, this lack of statisti-
cal significance is partly due to the limited
number of participants. In addition, it may be
that the two IAT indices measure partially
different things. Along this reasoning, the corre-
lation between the two IAT indices could be
interpreted in terms of discriminant validity.
Evaluation and emotions could correspond to
two different aspects of associations leading to
different behavioral responses (see Mierke &
Klauer, 1999). This hypothesis is certainly worth
pursuing.
Emotions as part of the human essence
Three major implications of the present
perspective are worth further discussion. The
first implication refers to the prejudicial role of
emotions. Contrary to other characteristics
linked to some objective standard, emotions
depend strongly upon the observers’ interpre-
tation. If we take the example of intelligence
and language, it is difficult to imagine that these
two uniquely human characteristics will be
denied to groups that have power and edu-
cation. As recently illustrated by Fiske, Xu,
Cuddy, and Glick (1999; Glick & Fiske, 1999),
high-status groups are generally perceived as
competent, even if people do not like them.
Conversely, low-status groups are perceived as
incompetent, even when they are considered
nice. To the same extent that group status does
not determine the ‘niceness’ of groups, we
predict that it will not affect the perceived ability
to experience secondary emotions. Thus,
emotional discrimination can occur indepen-
dently of status. In this perspective, denying
secondary emotions can be considered an avail-
able strategy for low-status groups in order to dis-
credit the human nature of high-status groups
(see Leyens et al., 2001; Demoulin et al., 2001b).
On the other hand, attribution of secondary
emotions may be one of the means to overcome
discrimination toward low-status groups. For
instance, Batson and his colleagues (1997) have
shown that thinking of a group member’s
emotional experience induces empathy toward
Group Processes & Intergroup Relations 5(2)
114
01 Paladino (to/d)  22/2/02  1:53 pm  Page 114
him or her and reduces the prejudice toward the
whole group. More direct evidence for the role
of secondary emotions on prosocial behavior
comes from a study conducted by Vaes,
Paladino, and Leyens (in press). This study
showed that people react with more solidarity
toward an (ingroup) individual who expressed a
secondary rather than a primary emotion.
The second implication concerns whether the
lack of one uniquely human characteristic can
disrupt the perceived human nature of a group.
According to our thesis (Leyens et al., 2000),
every uniquely human characteristic is neces-
sary, and none is sufficient, to attest a full
human nature. Therefore, restricting the full
human nature to ingroups leads to ‘infra-
humanize’ outgroups. The concept of infra-
humanization has antecedents in the
sociopsychological literature. For instance,
reserving for oneself the sense of humanity, by
moral exclusion (Staub, 1989, 1990), is con-
sidered a means to express and to justify the
exclusion of outgroup members from ‘the
boundary in which moral values, rules and con-
siderations of fairness apply’ (Opotow, 1990,
p. 1). When the human nature of an outgroup is
discredited or denied, harming its members
appears acceptable and any moral concern
becomes unnecessary (see also Bar-Tal, 1989,
1990; Schwartz & Struch, 1989).
The third implication derives from the second
one. When do people believe that ingroups and
outgroups have a different nature? From a
theoretical point of view, categories that are
believed to be unalterable, such as ethnicity,
gender, and race, should be the designated
targets of this kind of discrimination. Indeed,
the perceived impermeability of boundaries
between these categories calls for an expla-
nation of their radical differences. This expla-
nation is likely to be an essentialist one
(Hoffman & Hurst, 1990; Leyens, Yzerbyt, &
Schadron, 1994; Rothbart & Taylor, 1992). As it
has been shown by other research (e.g. Leyens
et al., 2001; Demoulin et al., 2001b), ‘infra-
humanization’ may also occur in the case of
national or linguistic groups, even when there is
no conflict between these groups. Assuredly,
conflict is a facilitating factor, but it is not a
necessary one. People may be likely to ‘essen-
tialize’ when identification with their ingroup is
made salient and when they feel the need to dif-
ferentiate their ingroup from outgroups. We are
currently conducting research to see whether
these two conditions suffice for essentialism to
take place.
Notes
1. This lay conception was investigated in another
study (Demoulin et al., 2001a) in which
American, Spanish, and French and Dutch-
speaking Belgian students were asked to judge on
several dimensions a series of a priori émotions and
a priori sentiments, half being positive and the rest
negative. The first dimension was the extent to
which participants considered the stimulus word
uniquely or not uniquely human. Other
dimensions were valence, desirability, intensity,
duration, visibility, origin of causation, morality,
cognition, informativeness, and age. A factorial
analysis validated the choice of stimuli. The first
factor could be interpreted in terms of humanity
and the second one in terms of valence.
2. Means for the three way interaction: 
Order of combined tasks
Compatible first Incompatible first
————————— ——————————–
List 400 ms 200 ms 400 ms 200 ms
1 806,604 861,258 882,236 871,813
2 850,883 813,997 791,159 818,043
3 770,388 847,271 968,033 920,787
4 856,299 940,193 861,733 821,452
5 802,085 828,72 928,488 927,288
3. The absence of an intertrial interval may explain
the somewhat higher rate of errors and the longer
reaction times in Study 4.
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